Liability of Hospitals for Wrongful Discharge of an Admitted Patient by Harris, Elliott
University of Miami Law School
Institutional Repository
University of Miami Law Review
7-1-1965
Liability of Hospitals for Wrongful Discharge of an
Admitted Patient
Elliott Harris
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr
This Case Noted is brought to you for free and open access by Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami Law
Review by an authorized administrator of Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact library@law.miami.edu.
Recommended Citation
Elliott Harris, Liability of Hospitals for Wrongful Discharge of an Admitted Patient, 19 U. Miami L. Rev. 652 (1965)
Available at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr/vol19/iss4/7
CASES NOTED
LIABILITY OF HOSPITALS FOR WRONGFUL DISCHARGE
OF AN ADMITTED PATIENT
On the advice of her doctor, a mother took her eleven year old son to
the defendant private hospital' for an appendectomy. After the hospital
staff removed the boy's clothes, dressed him in a hospital gown, adminis-
tered medication and examined him, he was required to leave, although
violently ill; his mother could not produce two hundred dollars which the
hospital demanded. As a result, the operation was performed several
hours later at another hospital. The boy recovered compensatory dam-
ages2 because his suffering was prolonged for that additional period of
time. On appeal, held, affirmed: Although any applicant for medical and
hospital services of a private hospital may be denied those services for any
reason, or for no reason at all, the rule is not applicable after the hospital
begins to treat a person, and it must not subsequently act unreasonably in
discharging him.' Le Juene Rd. Hosp., Inc. v. Watson, 171 So.2d 202
(Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
Although this case found the private hospital liable for the wrongful
discharge4 of a patient who had been admitted by the hospital's staff,'
1. A hospital is
any establishment that offers: (a) services more extensive than those required for
room, board, personal services and general nursing care; and (b) facilities and beds
for use beyond twenty-four hours by ten or more non-related individuals requiring
diagnosis, treatment or care for illness, injury . . . and regularly make available at
least: clinical laboratory services . . . treatment facilities for surgery . . . and one
registered nurse on duty at all times ....
FLA. STAT. § 395.01 (1963).
In Florida, anyone may conduct a private hospital if the state licensing regulations are
satisfied. The power to license and regulate the establishment, maintenance and operation of
hospitals is entrusted to the State Board of Health. FiA. STAT. § 395.03 (1963).
2. The jury compensated the boy to the extent of $5,000 which compensation was
affirmed on appeal. The mother had been awarded $10,000 punitive damages at trial, but this
award was reversed on appeal because she had not been awarded compensatory damages.
Le Juene Rd. Hosp., Inc. v. Watson, 171 So.2d 202, 204 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965). See note 24,
infra.
3. 171 So.2d at 203.
In other words, the hospital had initiated care and treatment of this patient and
had taken further steps than those necessary to determine whether or not they
were going to admit him.
4. Wilmington Gen. Hosp. v. Manlove, 174 A.2d 135 (Del. 1961); Bourgeois v. Dade
County, 99 So.2d 575 (Fla. 1957); Meiselman v. Crown Heights Hosp., 285 N.Y. 389, 34
N.E.2d 367 (1941).
5. Le Juene Rd. Hosp., Inc. v. Watson, 171 So.2d 202, 203 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965). cf.,
Birmingham Baptist Hosp. v. Crews, 229 Ala. 398, 157 So. 224 (1934) (The acts of swabbing
a child's throat, taking a specimen, administering oxygen and antitoxin were not enough to
show that the hospital had undertaken the obligation to render services to that child. The
hospital was found not liable for the child's subsequent death after his father was told to
remove him from the hospital.); O'Neill v. Montefiore Hosp., 11 App. Div. 2d 132, 202
N.Y.S.2d 436 (1960) (A nurse called a physician for the person seeking admission. It was
questionable whether this was a personal favor by the nurse or a rendition of hospital
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the defense that a private hospital is under no duty to admit any patient
that it does not desire is a firmly established rule of law.' This harsh
7
rule still prevails because a private' hospital is under no duty, to care for
an injured party until he is admitted.10 Unless a party is under a duty to
service and an assumption of duty. Hence, the hospital could be liable for the applicant's
subsequent death if he was admitted to the hospital.)
6. If the person seeking admission had a highly contagious disease and the hospital had
no duty, statutory or contractual, to accept that person for treatment, the hospital could
expose itself to liability to other patients by doing so. Birmingham Baptist Hosp. v. Crews,
229 Ala. 398, 157 So. 224 (1934) (diphtheria); Gadsden Gen. Hosp. v. Bishop, 209 Ala. 272,
96 So. 145 (1923) (smallpox). Even if a private hospital had contracted with a person
for out-patient services, the hospital could not be held negligent for failure to have a bed
available for the person's necessary hospitalization. There is no duty to have the bed
available for an out-patient whenever he may need one. Costa v. Regents of Univ. of Cal.,
116 Cal. App. 2d 445, 254 P.2d 85 (1953).
A private hospital is like a physician in the respect that neither has a duty to accept
any person for treatment. Findlay v. Board of Supervisors, 72 Ariz. 58, 230 P.2d 526 (1951) ;
Buttersworth v. Swint, 53 Ga. App. 602, 186 S.E. 770 (1936); Hurley v. Eddingfield, 156
Ind. 416, 59 N.E. 1058 (1901).
7. Le Juene Rd. Hosp., Inc. v. Watson, 171 So.2d 202, 203 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
(Emphasis added.) No rule other than permitting the trustees or governing board alone to
have the right to determine who shall be admitted as patients would be sensible or workable.
Wilmington Gen. Hosp. v. Manlove, 174 A.2d 135, 138 (Del. 1961).
8. The distinction between a public and a private hospital lies in the fact that the
former is an instrumentality of the state, operated in the public interest, supported by public
funds, and the authority of its management is derived from the state. Hughes v. Good
Samaritan Hosp., 289 Ky. 123, 158 S.W.2d 159 (1942); Van Campen v. Olean Gen. Hosp.,
210 App. Div. 204, 205 N.Y. Supp. 554, aff'd, 239 N.Y. 615, 147 N.E. 219 (1924). Private
hospitals are supported by voluntary contributions and are managed by their own governing
boards or trustees. Edson v. Griffin Hosp., 21 Conn. Supp. 55, 144 A.2d 341 (Super. Ct.
1958); Levin v. Sinai Hosp., 186 Md. 174, 46 A.2d 298 (1946),; Van Campen v. Olean Gen.
Hosp., supra.
The "private" status of a hospital is not disturbed even when that hospital receives
public funds. Wilmington Gen. Hosp. v. Manlove, 174 A.2d 135 (Del. 1961); West Coast
Hosp. Ass'n v. Hoare, 64 So.2d 293 (Fla. 1953); Levin v. Sinai Hosp., supra; Van Campen
v. Olean Gen. Hosp., supra.
FLA. STAT. ch. 155 (1963) pertains to "County Hospitals," i.e., public hospitals. With
certain exceptions, "every (public] hospital . . . shall be for the benefit of the inhabitants
of such county and of any person falling sick or being injured or maimed within its
limits . . . ." FLA. STAT. § 155.16 (1963).
9. A successful negligence action requires the plaintiff to establish four elements of
equal importance:
(1) a duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff to use reasonable care to avoid
injury to the plaintiff; (2) a failure of the defendant to live up to the duty so
imposed-a failure to use due care under the circumstances; (3) a causal connection
-that the defendant's act, in fact as well as legally, caused plaintiff's injury;
(4) real, and not nominal, damage to the plaintiff.
Myers, Causation and Common Sense, 5 MLAsi L.Q. 238, 241 (1951). See also, PROSSER,
TORTS § 30 (3d ed. 1964); RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 281 (1934). These four elements that
make up the working analysis of negligence cases have also been termed: (1) the right-duty
element; (2) the negligence element; (3) the causal relation element; and (4) the damage
element. Green, The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases, 28 COLum. L. REv. 1014, 1022
(1928).
10. The admission of the applicant to the hospital need not be by filling out the
required admission forms. Cases cited note 4 supra. Duty, in actions against hospitals based
on negligence, is alleged as "patient's status as pay patient, or other facts showing de-
fendant's duty to plaintiff." 4 FRaumra, BENOIT & FREDYLAN, PERSONAL INJURY § 201, at
436 (1957).
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exercise care toward the interests of another, a cause of action for negli-
gence cannot be maintained.1
Purely moral or humanitarian considerations ordinarily impose no
legal obligations. Generally, a person is under no legal duty to volunteer
aid to another who is sick or injured when this condition was not proxi-
mately caused by the former's negligence. 2 The judiciary has found no
duty on the part of a person to act when it is not part of his "under-
taking," even if he has it in his power, by taking some reasonable precau-
tion, to minimize a dangerous situation. It does not matter how unreason-
able or reprehensible the defendant's failure to act may be.'"
The law of torts rarely finds a duty that compels a person to perform
an act rather than merely control the act he performs; it has been sug-
gested, however, that the idea of an "affirmative duty" to act rather than
misfeasance is the more modern concept in legal science.' 4 This would
shift the basis of personal liability from that which a man does, to that
which he ought to do.'" These "affirmative duties," however, seem to be
11. United States v. Marshall, 230 F.2d 183 (9th Cir. 1956) ; Schmidt v. United States,
179 F.2d 724 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 986 (1950); Russell v. Jacksonville Gas
Corp., 117 So.2d 29 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1960); Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339,
162 N.E. 99 (1928).
12 Allen v. Hixson, 111 Ga. 460, 36 S.E. 810 (1900) (allowing another to bleed to
death); Hurley v. Eddingfield, 156 Ind. 416, 59 N.E. 1058 (1901) (a physician failed to
attend a man who was close to death); Osterlind v. Hill, 263 Mass. 73, 160 N.E. 301
(1928) (lessor of overturned canoe failed to respond to drowning man's cries); Buch
v. Amory Mfg. Co., 69 N.H. 257, 44 AUt. 809 (1898) (a child was injured because of failure
to remove him from the proximity of dangerous machinery).
13. Ibid.
14. Snyder, Liability for Negative Conduct, 35 VA. L. REV. 446, 479 (1949); Carpenter,
Workable Rules for Determining Proximate Cause, 20 CALIF. L. REV. 229, 396, 471 (1932).
In Holland, refusal to aid a person "in danger of death" resulted in a fine of 300
florins and imprisonment of up to three months if aid could have been given "without
reasonable fear of danger to himself or another" and if the death of the person in distress
followed. DUTCH PENAL CODE art. 450, as translated into English in SEAVEY, KEETON &
KEETON, CASES ON TORTS 157 (1957). For other laws establishing criminal liability for
non-feasance see Dawson, Negotiorum Gestio: The Altruistic Intermeddler, 74 HARV. L.
REv. 817, 1073, 1101-1106 (1961).
It is questionable whether the Florida courts will ever find a man guilty of manslaughter
for failing to give his wife needed medical attention. The First District avoided the issue
by deciding that the husband's conduct was not the cause of death in Neveils v. State,
145 So.2d 883 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1962). Similarly, a father was held not guilty of manslaughter
when he failed to furnish medical aid to a badly burned child. Bradley v. State, 79 Fla.
651, 84 So. 677 (1920) (this failure to act was predicated upon a religious belief of the
child's father).
15. The community at large does not think it unjustifiable to impose affirmative duties
on any group, as the spirit of reform is bringing the law more in harmony with moral
principles. Ames, Law and Morals, 22 HARV. L. REV. 97, 113 (1908). This is not to say
that the community or a group will act when they are confronted with a moral duty to
render aid. Newspapers and magazines are continuously informing their readers of the
most frightening aspect of the present crime problem-public apathy. These words describe
the public attitude toward criminal acts and human suffering. E.g., Luce, Without Port-
folio, McCall's, Sept., 1964, vol. 91, p. 18; Kofoed, Which the Criminals, Where's the
Justice? Miami Herald, July 20, 1965, § D, p. 21, col. 6; Miami Herald, July 19, 1965,
§ A, p. 13, col. 4; N.Y. Times, July 2, 1964, p. 17, col. 7; N.Y. Times, March 28, 1964,
p. 18, col. 2.
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imposed only in situations in which one has voluntarily created a relation-
ship with others from which he expects to obtain a benefit, i.e., a "con-
sideration" of sorts moving to the person under the alleged duty."'
Typical of those burdened with this duty to render assistance are
master-servant 7 carrier-passenger," host-invitee, 9 and other businesses
engaged in "public callings" such as warehouses and public utilities which
are obligated to serve all.20 A hospital, public or private, is a business that
is affected with a public interest.21 Its duty to serve could arise as with
other businesses listed as "public callings. ' 22
An inroad upon this "no duty" rule was made in Wilmington Gen.
Hosp. v. Manlove25 when the Supreme Court of Delaware established a
cause of action for the wrongful death of an infant who died shortly after
16. McNiece & Thornton, Affirmative Duties in Tort, 58 YALE L.J. 1272, 1289 (1949).
These writers contend that liability for non-feasance has existed for centuries in the areas
of tort law involving benefit to the obligor and it would be but a small extension to impose
liability for breach of a clear moral obligation-even if there is no relationship involving
a benefit which creates a duty to act.
17. Here the duty of reasonable care was limited to emergency situations where im-
mediate medical attention was required. Burns v. Bakelite Corp., 17 N.J. Super. 441, 86
A.2d 289 (1952); Rival v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 62 N.M. 159, 306 P.2d 648 (1957);
Petersen v. Alkema, 123 Utah 604, 261 P.2d 175 (1953).
18. Trichel v. City of Monroe, 43 So.2d 284 (La. App. 1949); O'Leary v. Metropolitan
Transit Authority, 339 Mass. 328, 159 N.E.2d 91 (1959); Continental So. Lines, Inc. v.
Robertson, 241 Miss. 796, 133 So.2d 543 (1961).
19. L. S. Ayers & Co. v. Hicks, 220 Ind. 86, 40 N.E.2d 334 (1942) (A six year old
boy accompanied his mother to defendant's store where he caught his fingers in an escalator.
Defendant was not negligent in causing the initial injury, but was held liable for aggrava-
tion of injuries in failing to exercise reasonable care in stopping the escalator.); Depue
v. Flateau, 100 Minn. 299, 111 N.W. 1 (1907) (Defendant owed the plaintiff cattle buyer
a duty of reasonable care, since he invited the latter for supper. Upon discovering that
the buyer had become seriously ill the defendant started him on his way home. He fell
from his carriage and was found the next morning).
20. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS § 314 A (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1960); PROSSER, TORTS
§ 54 (3d ed. 1964).
21. The rules regarding the maintenance and operation of private hospitals are to be
designed to promote "safe and adequate treatment of individuals in hospitals in the interest
of public health, safety and welfare." FLA. STAT. § 395.07 (1963). (Emphasis added.)
Many times private hospitals receive public funds. Cases cited note 8 supra.
22. "The most common examples of such a duty are cases where action is directed
toward the person of another or his property . . . . A like principle applies, however,
where action is directed toward the governance of conduct." Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N.Y.
236, 240, 135 N.E. 275, 276 (1922) (Cardozo, J.). But see Hurley v. Eddingfield, 156 Ind.
416, 59 N.E. 1058 (1901) (The court stated that comparing the duty of a physician with
public calling cases "missed the mark.").
The duty to use care was imposed on those engaged in a trade or calling as a common
practice from very early law. The duty to serve, however, was placed on all trades and
callings during the time of the Black Death in England (1348 A.D.), which may account
for the confusion of the word "common" with "public." The "duty to serve" was then
imposed on the businesses known today as "public callings" and the main factor that de-
termined if a business came within this class was the importance of the business to the
public. Arterburn, The Origin and First Test of Public Callings, 75 U. PA. L. REv. 411, 428
(1927).
23. 174 A.2d 135 (Del. 1961). This case was noted as a private hospital's duty to
admit an unmistakable emergency in the following periodicals: 62 COLUM. L. Rxv. 730
(1962); 14 STAN. L. Rxv. 910 (1962); 40 TEXAs L. REv. 732 (1962); 31 U. CiNc. L. REv.
183 (1962); 64 W. VA. L. Rxv. 234 (1962).
1965]
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the defendant private hospital refused treatment in its emergency ward.
Jurisdictions which follow this decision may find a private hospital liable
for refusal to care for a person if: (1) the hospital maintains an emer-
gency ward; (2) the situation was an unmistakable emergency; and (3)
the patient knew it was customary for the hospital to treat such cases.
When the maintenance of an emergency ward has become well estab-
lished as a part of the main business of the hospital, a seriously injured
person who relies on the established custom of the hospital to render aid
should be treated.24 Refusal might well result in worsening the condition
of the injured person because of the time lost in a useless attempt to
obtain medical aid.
25
The question then presents itself: Why should the duty of a private
hospital to admit patients be limited to emergency patients in an emer-
gency ward as in the Manlove case? If it is the established custom of a
24. Wilmington Gen. Hosp. v. Manlove, 174 A.2d 135, 140 (Del. 1961).
25. The hospital naturally would not be liable for the initial injury or illness, but they
would be liable for the aggravated injury or illness which the jury would measure monetarily
by the additional pain and suffering that the plaintiff endured. Le Juene Rd. Hosp., Inc. v.
Watson, 171 So.2d 202, 204 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965). Cf., L. S. Ayers & Co. v. Hicks, 220 Ind.
86, 40 N.E.2d 334 (1942); Zelenko v. Gimbel Bros., 158 Misc. 904, 287 N.Y. Supp. 134 (Sup.
Ct. 1935). For a discussion of the advocate's problems in helping the jury decide a monetary
award for pain and suffering, see generally Comment, 15 U. MIAmi L. REV. 85 (1960).
There is no distinction more deeply rooted in the common law and more funda-
mental than that between misfeasance and non-feasance, between active miscon-
duct working positive injury to others and passive inaction, a failure to take
positive steps to benefit others, or to protect them from harm not created by
any wrongful act of the defendant.
Bohlen, The Moral Duty to Aid Others as a Basis of Tort Liability, 56 U. PA. L. Thzv.
217, 219 (1908).
But stare decisis dictates that if D undertakes to provide services to the public,
absent a duty to do so, and P relies on D's past performances and is injured as a result,
liability could be imposed. Kurzweg v. Hotel St. Regis Corp., 309 F.2d 746 (2d Cir. 1962)
recently held a New York hotel operator liable for negligence in a similar factual situation.
The hotel furnished a doorman although it was under no duty to do so. The plaintiff
stepped out of a double-parked taxicab and walked toward the hotel. Because the doorman
did not assist her, she was injured by a car which backed into her. Allegedly, the plaintiff's
injuries were caused by the doorman's negligent failure to act.
"It is ancient learning that one who assumes to act, even though gratuitously, may
thereby become subject to the duty of acting carefully, if he acts at all." Glanzer v.
Shepard, 233 N.Y. 236, 239, 135 N.E. 275, 276 (1922) (Cardozo, J.). Accord, United States
v. Lawter, 219 F.2d 559 (5th Cir. 1955); Erie R.R. v. Stewart, 40 F.2d 855 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 282 U.S. 843 (1930) (railroad was not under a legal duty to have a watchman
at a crossing; however, the railroad was held liable for failure to give adequate warning
after having vountarily provided a watchman); Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Applegate's Adm'x,
268 Ky. 458, 105 S.W.2d 153 (1937) (railroad did not have a legal duty to slow down
or sound signals at a crossing, but had established the custom of sounding such signals);
Burns v. Bakelite Corp., 17 N.J. Super. 441, 86 A.2d 289 (1952).
Even if there is no relationship present that would impose an affirmative duty, there
is a duty to avoid any affirmative acts which could make a situation worse. Does the name
"hospital," when relied upon by a layman as a place that would heal his ills, constitute
an affirmative act in itself? This could cause delay in reaching aid, and thus impose a
duty on the hospital. This may not be considered a "passive" act of the hospital. The
relationship of the hospital to the community-the hospital's presence alone--could be
construed as actual encouragement on their part for one in need of aid to stop there.
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private hospital to admit patients recommended by certain doctors, not-
withstanding the lack of an emergency and the lack of an emergency
ward, the applicant's reliance2° on this custom should force the hospital
to admit him. Consequently, liability should be imposed on the hospital
for any added pain and suffering that a person needlessly endures.27
If a person who is in need of hospital care relies upon the hospital's tacit
representations of competency and care to others with like needs, the
duty to admit which arises by estoppel should not be limited to the
emergency ward.2
Many cases which imposed liability for actions or failure to act
in the name of "negligence," where there were physical injuries, could
have reached the same result because the plaintiff "relied on a gratuitous
promise."2 For example a motorist's failure to signal for a turn which
leads another to a collision is surely negligence; but the injury also
resulted because the plaintiff believed that the actor would continue giv-
ing signals as he had done in the past. ° If a person by word or conduct
negligently causes another to believe in the existence of a certain state of
things whereby the latter is induced to act so as to change his own
position injuriously, an estoppel may arise."' If a volunteer has worsened
the plaintiff's position by affirmatively misleading him, or inducing his
reliance, or deterring other would-be volunteers, a duty of ordinary care
is owed.12
26. The element of "reliance" would probably have to be proved by actual prior
contact with the hospital or secondary knowledge that the particular hospital provided such
care in the past. Cf., Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Maxwell, 292 Ky. 660, 167 S.W.2d 841 (1943);
Mixon v. Brechtel, 174 So. 283 (La. App. 1937); Cooper v. Powder Puff, Inc., 184 So.
593 (La. App. 1938). The representation relied on need not result from an express statement;
it could be implied, either from acts, silence or other conduct. Davis v. Evans, 132 So.2d
476 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1961) ; State v. Missouri Utilities Co., 339 Mo. 385, 96 S.W.2d 607 (1936).
27. See note 25 supra.
28. Although the Manlove case was not supported by previous hospital "admission"
cases, it was predicated on the theory that if a hospital holds itself out to treat emergency
situations, it should be estopped to deny admission to its emergency ward.
29. Justice requires that a defendant pay for the harm caused by the foreseeable
reliance upon the performance of his "promise." Seavey, Reliance Upon Gratuitous Promises
or Other Conduct, 64 HARv. L. REV. 913, 926 (1951). Accord, RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 323
(1934).
30. Cf., Haralson v. Jones Truck Line, 223 Ark. 813, 270 S.W.2d 892 (1954); Sweet
v. Ringwelski, 362 Mich. 138, 106 N.W.2d 742 (1961).
31. Estoppel is basically a tort principle. Seavey, supra note 29, at 919. The essential
elements of estoppel are:
(1) a representation by the party estopped to the party claiming the estoppel as
to some material fact, which representation is contrary to the condition of affairs
later asserted by the estopped party; (2) a reliance upon this representation by
the party claiming the estoppel; and (3) a change in the position of the party
claiming the estoppel to his detriment, caused by the representation and his reliance
thereon.
Davis v. Evans, 132 So.2d 476, 481 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1961); State v. Missouri Utilities Co.,
339 Mo. 385, 402, 96 S.W.2d 607, 614 (1936).
32. Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955); Frank v. United States,
250 F.2d 178 (3d Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 962 (1958); Marsalis v. La Salle, 94
So.2d 120 (La. App. 1957); cases cited note 27 supra.
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The issue regarding a private hospital's duty to accept any appli-
cant arises only when the hospital refuses the injured persons request to
render aid. But this request for treatment alone should give rise to a
relationship which imposes a duty of "humanitarianism" and liability
upon the hospital for breach of a doctrine8 based upon the precepts of
morality and natural justice. The goal sought is that each person (not
only hospitals) should exercise ordinary care for the preservation of
another after seeing him in peril or about to become imperiled, when the
injury may be averted without the likelihood of injury to others or to
the actor. 4
A Good Samaritan doctrine could then protect the hospital from
subsequent actions for malpractice if it had acted in good faith. Under the
common law, a physician could ignore an injured person with complete
impunity. The Good Samaritan could be liable for subsequent injuries
while the passerby would not be penalized.88 In an attempt to induce a
physician to render volunteer assistance in rescue operations, Good
Samaritan statutes have been passed granting him immunity from actions
for malpractice if he acted in good faith.86 These statutes could be
extended to include hospitals.
33. Although the "last clear chance" or "humanitarian" doctrine evolved to permit
recovery because the remedy on the basis of primary negligence was inadequate, its appli-
cation to the subject matter of this article could be in order.
The Missouri humanitarian rule is generally applicable where (1) the plaintiff is in a
position of peril; (2) defendant has actual notice of plaintiff's peril; (3) defendant then
had the ability to avoid injury without endangering himself or others; (4) defendant failed
to exercise ordinary care; (5) his failure caused injury to the plaintiff. Price v. Nicholson,
340 S.W.2d 1, 5 (Mo. 1960); Largo v. Bonadonna, 269 S.W.2d 879, 882 (Mo. 1954); Banks
v. Morris & Co., 302 Mo. 254, 267, 257 S.W. 482, 484 (1924).
The "last clear chance" doctrine was born in England, with the landmark decision
of Davies v. Mann, 10 M. & W. 546, 152 Eng. Rep. 588 (Ex. 1842), and was adopted by
the Florida courts in Merchant Transp. Co. v. Daniel, 109 Fla. 496, 149 So. 401 (1933).
As applied in Florida, this doctrine has greater depth because the defendant does not
actually have to discover the victim's peril; it is sufficient that he should have in the
exercise of reasonable care. James v. Keene, 133 So.2d 297 (Fla. 1961). See generally,
Comment, 17 U. MIAmi L. REv. 582 (1963).
Although this doctrine's applicability has been limited to situations in which at least
one of the parties was operating an instrument of transportation, its basic concept-that
the party with the ability to save life or property should be made to do so-could also
apply to Refused Admission Private Hospital cases.
34. Cf., Price v. Nicholson, 340 S.W.2d 1, 8 (Mo. 1960) (dictum); Banks v. Morris
& Co., 302 Mo. 254, 267, 257 S.W. 482, 484 (1924) (dictum).
35. Buch v. Amory Mfg. Co., 69 N.H. 257, 260, 44 At. 809, 811 (1898); PROSSER,
TORTS § 54, at 339 (3d ed. 1964).
36. California was the first state (1959) to enact a statute which relieved medical
practitioners of civil liability for malpractice when they rendered emergency care in
good faith at the scene of an emergency. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2144 (1960). This was
to encourage emergency treatment to injured persons. Similar statutes have since been
adopted in thirty states.
New Mexico, Tennessee, and Texas extend immunity beyond medical practitioners to
all persons rendering emergency care. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 12-12-3 (Supp. 1963); TENr.
CODE AiN. § 63-622 (Supp. 1964); TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. art. la (Supp. 1964). See gen-
erally Comment, 64 CoLu-m. L. REv. 1301 (1964).
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Although black letter law still allows private hospitals to select with
impunity the applicants they will admit, "changing social conditions lead
constantly to the recognition of new duties. No better general statement
can be made, than that the courts will find a duty where, in general,
reasonable men would recognize it and agree that it exists.
''
,
ELLIOTT HARRIS
APPEAL-ACCEPTANCE OF THE BENEFITS OF A
DIVORCE DECREE
Appellant was granted a divorce from the appellee in 1951. The
divorce decree provided -alimony for the appellant in the amount of 500
dollars per month. In 1964, the circuit court, in a post-decretal order,
reduced the alimony award to 400 dollars per month. After accepting
two payments, the appellant appealed from the modified order. The ap-
pellee moved to dismiss the appeal, held, dismissed: one who has ac-
cepted the benefits of a divorce decree is estopped from subsequently
appealing from the benefits. Fort v. Fort, 167 So.2d 315 (Fla. Ist Dist.
1964).'
The majority of case law, dealing with the availability of appeal
to one who has accepted the benefits of a judgment,' holds that the dis-
satisfied winning party is estopped from taking the appeal from the spe-
cific benefits accepted.' Courts have founded their use of estoppel on
various theories, all of which reach the same end result-dismissal of
the appeal. Some of the more prevalent theories are that: an appellant
cannot take two inconsistent positions, both accepting the award and
appealing therefrom; 4 an appellant consents to a release of errors when
37. PROSSER, TORTS § 53, at 334 (3d ed. 1964).
1. The majority was of the opinion that the appellant should have complied with the
provisions of FLA. R. App. P. 3.8 (1962 Revision) in order to avoid dismissal of her appeal.
This rule provides that a wife may petition the trial court for a subsistence allowance pend-
ing appeal.
2. E.g., Shannon Copper Co. v. Potter, 14 Ariz. 481, 131 Pac. 157 (1913); Morton v.
Superior Ct., 65 Cal. 496, 4 Pac. 489 (1884); Stallings v. Shell Petroleum Corp., 54 Ga.
App. 359, 188 S.E. 50 (1936); Holt v. Rees, 46 Ill. 181 (1867); Knapp v. Brown, 45 N.Y.
207 (1871). See generally, Annot., 169 A.L.R. 986 (1941).
3. San Bernardino County v. Riverside County, 135 Cal. 618, 67 Pac. 1047 (1902).
The appellee must file a motion to dismiss in the appellate court when attacking the right
to the appeal. See also Cohen v. Cohen, 102 Cal. App. 2d 624, 228 P.2d 54 (1951) ; Bass v.
Ring, 210 Minn. 598, 299 N.W. 679 (1941); Sherman v. Sherman, 89 Ore. 130, 173 Pac. 572
(1918); Wallace v. Wallace, 371 S.W.2d 918 (Tex. 1963).
4. "[Tlhe right to proceed on a judgment and enjoy its fruits, and the right to attack
it on appeal, are totally inconsistent positions, so that the party's election to pursue the
one course must be taken as an abandonment of the other." Knebel v. Knebel, 189 S.W.2d
464, 466 (Mo. Ct. App. 1945).
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